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CASE SUMMARIES
Schafer v. Time, Inc.
142 F.3d 1361 (1lth Cir. 1998)
INTRODUCTION
On June 8, 1998, plaintiff Michael Schafer ("Schafer") won a
new trial in his libel action against Time, Inc. ("Time"). Schafer
had sued Time for libel after the magazine misidentified him as an
international terrorist in an article dated April 20, 1992, entitled
"The Untold Story of Pan Am 103. "1 The Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit ruled, inter alia, that the District Court's denial of
Schafer's motion for a new trial should be reversed. The Appellate
Court held Schafer deserved a new trial due to the District Court's
re-charge of the jury concerning the definition of "malicious" as
used in Georgia's libel laws.
During the course of deliberations, the jury was confused about
the definition of libel. The jury was uncertain whether, in order for
libel to exist, a malicious statement had to be intended to cause
harm or merely be a statement whose nature would cause harm.'
In attempting to resolve this confusion for the jury, the District
Court incorrectly interpreted Georgia's libel laws. The District
Court then re-charged the jury that in order for a statement to be
malicious the statement had to be intended to injure.4 After a
thorough examination of the record and applicable precedent, the
Appellate Court held that the District Court had erroneously re-
charged the jury, and as a result the jury had misinterpreted
Georgia's libel laws by requiring intent to do harm in order to state
a claim of libel.' The Appellate Court stated it had an
1. Schafer v. Time, Inc., 142 F.3d 1361 (1lth Cir. 1998).
2. Id. at 1368.
3. Id. at 1365-1368.
4. Id. at 1367-1368.
5. Id.
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"ineradicable doubt" the jury found for Time because Schafer had
not proven Time intended to injure him. 6
BACKGROUND
On December 21, 1988, Pan American Airways Flight 103
exploded in midair over Lockerbie, Scotland.7 This tragic event
claimed the lives of all 259 passengers and 11 crew members on
board Experts from numerous countries conducted a thorough
investigation to determine the cause of the crash. 9  The
distinguished panel concluded that a bomb planted in the forward
cargo hold of Flight 103 caused the in-flight explosion." Experts
believed that the trigger mechanism on the bomb indicated
international terrorists were responsible for the attack. These same
authorities surmised that the bomb may have been planted in
retaliation for the United States Navy's downing of an Iranian
passenger airliner in the Persian Gulf earlier that year.11
Time's April 20, 1992, issue featured an article entitled "The
Untold Story of Pan Am 103."'" This article discredited the
popular and widely accepted theory that the government of Libya
had coordinated the attack on Flight 103.3 Time's article argued
that a Palestinian group with ties to Syrian drug traffickers blew up
Flight 103."4 The alleged motive for the bombing was to eliminate
members of a United States anti-terrorist team who were on board
Flight 103. I" Time's article claimed that the targets of the attack
had discovered, and intended to expose upon returning to the
United States, an illegal relationship between the Syrian drug
traffickers and the Central Intelligence Agency. 6
6. Schafer, 142 F.2d at 1368.
7. Schafer v. Time, Inc., 1994 WL 720256 (N.D. Ga., 1994).
8. Id. at 1.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Schafer, 142 F.3d at 1364.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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Of particular importance to this case, Time's article alleged Mr.
David Lovejoy ("Lovejoy"), an American agent, had become a
double agent and leaked the team's travel information to terrorist
forces.17 Time ran a picture of an individual whom it claimed to be
Lovejoy. This picture featured a caption referring to the individual
in the picture as the alleged "double agent."' 8 The article went on
to state that Lovejoy's disclosure of the team's travel plans led to
the attack on Flight 103.19 The individual in the picture was
actually the plaintiff, Michael Schafer.2" As the Appellate Court
stated, "Time's article erroneously identified Schafer ... both as a
traitor to the United States government and a player in the bombing
of Pan Am 103.""1 Schafer learned of the error and soon thereafter
contacted Time regarding the matter.22 Time published a retraction
in its May 25, 1992, edition.23
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 6, 1993, Schafer filed a complaint in the Northern
District of Georgia against Time alleging that he was libeled when
Time misidentified him as an international terrorist in its April 27th
article.24 Time answered the complaint on May 12, 1993, and two
17. Schafer, 142 F.3d at 1364.
18. The full text of the caption read: "David Lovejoy, a reported double
agent for the U.S. and Iran, is alleged to have told Iranian officials that McKee
[one of the U.S. agents] was booked on Flight 103." Schafer, 142 F.3d at 1364 -
1365.
19. Schafer, 142 F.3d at 1365.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. The full text of the retraction printed by Time read: "Corrections: Our
report on the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 [Cover Stories, April 27] included
a photograph that had been identified in court documents as being David
Lovejoy, a reported double agent for the U.S. and Iran. Michael Schafer of
Austell, Ga., has informed us that this photograph is of him, not Lovejoy.
Schafer, who says he never used the name Lovejoy and had nothing to do with
the Pan Am disaster, believes that the picture is a copy of one that was taken of
him in 1985 when he worked in Beruit. Time regrets that Schafer's photograph
was used in error." Schafer, 1994 WL 720256 at 2.
24. Schafer, 1994 WL 720256 at 2.
1998]
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days later filed a motion for summary judgment.25 The District
Court denied Time's motion for summary judgment in a published
opinion. In 1996 the case proceeded to a jury trial. 26
At trial, the jury was instructed that Georgia's statutory
definition of libel used the term "malicious." '27 The court also
instructed the jury that Schafer had to have made a "clear and
convincing showing of 'actual malice' in order to recover
compensatory and punitive damages.28 In its instruction to the
jury, the District Court referred to malice in two different contexts:
1) to describe the character of the defamatory statement necessary
to state a claim of libel; and 2) to describe the level of intent
necessary for Schafer to recover consequential and punitive
damages. 29 The jury was confused by these different definitions of
malice and asked the District Court for an explanation of how the
term malice should be used in Georgia's statutory definition of
libel.3"
In response to the jury's query, the District Court attempted to
differentiate between the concepts of "malicious statement" and
"actual malice."' As part of its explanation, the court incorrectly
stated that the term "malicious statement" denotes "statements
deliberately calculated to injure. '  After hearing this explanation,
25. Id.
26. Schafer v. Time, Inc. 1994 WL 720256 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
27. The full instruction provided to the jury read: "[A] libel is a false and
malicious defamation of another expressed in print, writing, pictures or signs,
tending to injure the reputation of the person exposing him to public hatred,
contempt or ridicule." Schafer, 142 F.3d at 1365 quoting O.C.G.A. § 51-5-1(a).
28. The full definition given to the jury read: "A publication is made with
actual malice if it is made with knowledge that it is false or with reckless
disregard of whether it is false or not. In order to demonstrate actual malice, the
plaintiff must demonstrate more than just negligence by a preponderance of the
evidence. He must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the challenged
libel was made by the defendant with knowledge or that such statements were
false or that the defendant acted with reckless disregard to their falsity." Schafer,
142 F.3d at 1365.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. The bulk of the District Court's repudiation read: "Malicious, as used in
this particular paragraph... is not the same as the term actual malice, which is
206 [Vol. IX:203
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the jury deliberated for less than two hours and returned a verdict
in favor of Time.3Schafer appealed to the District Court for a new trial. Schafer
claimed that the court's re-charge, especially the addition of the
phrase "deliberately calculated to injure," improperly led the jury
to believe that in order to find Time liable, it had to find that Time
intended to injure Schafer bypublishing the photograph.
The District Court denied Schafer's motion for a new trial and
Schafer appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. The Appellate Court
heard Schafer's appeal and reversed and remanded the District
Court's decision.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
As the Appellate Court acknowledged in its opinion, Georgia's
libel laws are confusing, and it is often difficult to properly instruct
a jury. 4 The Appellate Court looked to clarify Georgia's libel laws
as set out in Straw v. Chase Revel, Inc. 5 In Straw, the court
defined actual malice in the context of punitive damages while also
defining common law malice as used in the statutory definition of
libel.36 The Straw court explained that actual malice, for the
purpose of recovering punitive damages, refers to the speaker's
knowledge of the truth of the statement. 7 Common law malice in
the statutory definition of libel, however, only refers to the nature
of the statement, not what the speaker intended by making the
statement. 8
The difficulty with the use of "malicious" in this case is that a
private plaintiff in Georgia may successfully state a claim of libel
defimed for you in connection with Mr. Schafer's claim that injury to his
reputation should be presumed. Instead, as used here, it, along with the word
false that proceeds it, describes the character of a defamation that is libelous. It
denotes statements deliberately calculated to injure. In all actions for
defamation, this type of malice may be inferred from the character of the charge
but it is may be rebutted by proof." Schafer, 142 F.3d at 1366.
33. Schafer, 142 F.3d at 1366.
34. Id.
35. Straw v. Chase Revel, Inc., 813 F.2d 356 (11tF Cir. 1987).
36. O.C.G.A. Section 51-5-1.
37. Id.
38. Id.
1998] 207
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without proving intent.39 In order to state a claim for libel a
plaintiff need only show that the statement was malicious; the
speaker's intent is not relevant.4" As a result, any re-charge by the
court requiring the plaintiff to show intent to injure in order to state
a claim of libel would be in opposition to the negligence standard
established by the Georgia common law.4' Moreover, to recover
consequential and punitive damages for libel, a plaintiff must show
that statements were made with actual malice.42 Therefore, the jury
had to deal with two different uses of malice, one to state a claim
for libel and one to recover for consequential and punitive
damages.
The Appellate Court clarified the confusion concerning the
necessary mental state required to state a claim of libel. The
Appellate Court stated that "the term malicious modifies only the
statement at issue; the defendant's subjective state of mind or
intentions toward the plaintiff are irrelevant at this point in the
jury's analysis. 4 3 In discussing the requirements for a malicious
statement, the court held that any statement could be malicious,
regardless of the speaker's intent, if the statement suggests
injurious things about the subject of the statement to an ordinary
reader.'
To support its conclusion, the Appellate Court cited to Simon v.
Sherman Lehman Bros., Inc.4" In Simon, the court wrote "common
law malice is presumed from the character of the defamatory
statement and has nothing to do with the defendant's state of
mind."'  This statement, along with the Appellate Court's
clarification of the Shaw holding, demonstrated that under
Georgia's libel laws, the jury should not have focused on Time's
intent in publishing the picture and caption when determining
liability. Instead, the jury should have concentrated solely on the
39. Id.
40. Schafer, 142 F.3d at 1366.
41. Id. at 1367.
42. Id. at 1366.
43. Id. at 1367.
44. Id.
45. Simon v. Sherman Lehman Bros., Inc., 895 F.2d 1304 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
46. Schafer, 142 F.3d at 1367 quoting Simon, 895 F.2d at 1320.
208 [Vol. IX:203
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nature of the statements made by Time. The jury should not have
considered Time's ill will, or lack thereof, in publishing the picture
and caption until the remedial phase of the trial.
Finally, in reversing the District Court's denial of Schafer's
motion for a new trial, the Appellate Court did recognize that a
district court should be granted deference when recharging the
jury.47 The Eleventh Circuit will only reverse a charge to the jury
if the court is "left with a substantial and ineradicable doubt as to
whether the jury was properly guided in its deliberations."48 The
Appellate Court in Schafer felt that the multiple uses of malice,
along with the District Court's re-charge to the jury, left the jury's
attention unfocused on the issue paramount to the case, the nature
of the statements in question.49 This confusion left the Appellate
Court with a "substantial and ineradicable doubt" that the jury was
not suitably directed in its deliberations." As a result, the
Appellate Court reversed the District Court's holding and
remanded the case for a new trial. 1
CONCLUSION
This case allowed the Eleventh Circuit to clarify the confusing,
yet important issue, of what mental state, if any, is necessary to
state a claim of libel. After Schafer, it is apparent that a plaintiff
need only show a statement was malicious to state a claim of libel.
The intent of the speaker is not relevant unless the plaintiff
attempts to recover punitive or consequential damages. Only in an
attempt to recover these types of damages will the plaintiff have
the burden to show the intent of the speaker in a libel case.
47. Schafer, 142 F.3d at 1368.
48. Id. (quoting Carter v. DecisionOne Corp., 122 F.3d 997, 1005 (1 1th Cir.
1997)).
49. Schafer, 142 F.3d at 1368.
50. Id.
51. Id. The Appellate Court reversed and remanded on the grounds discussed
in this Case Summary. The Appellate Court also ruled on a number of
evidentiary rulings made by the District Court during the jury trial. While the
Appellate Court did not find those issues dispositive due to its remand based on
the re-charge to the jury, the Appellate Court felt the need to rule on those
evidentiary issues in anticipation of the issues arising again during subsequent
litigation in this matter. Those issues are not germane to this Case Summary.
1998]
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